Feeling Troubled After Witnessing, Failing to Act, or Acting in an Immoral Way by Bredesen, Kelsey
  
  
 
 
FEELING TROUBLED AFTER WITNESSING, FAILING TO 
ACT, OR ACTING IN AN IMMORAL WAY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
KELSEY BREDESEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
 
 
 
Presented to the Department of Psychology  
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts 
 
June, 2015 

  
iii  
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Professor Arrow and William Schumacher for helping me 
to fully examine the topics of regret and morality.  I thank Professor Arrow for 
continuing to help me through the writing process and for guiding me to new and 
exciting research subjects, and William Schumacher for creating the surveys used, 
helping me to understand and delve into the data, and for continuing to research the 
impacts of moral injury. Additional thanks go to Professor Jordan Pennefather, who was 
an invaluable resource on generalized linear models and analyzing the data. I would 
also like to thank my family and friends, for their steadfast and constant stream of 
support. 
I dedicate this thesis to my grandfather, an educator for over 30 years and a 
veteran himself. I would have been proud to share this work with him and I am deeply 
saddened by his passing this year.  
   
  
iv  
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction 1 
Regret 3 Regret After Actions or Inactions 3 
Morality 7 Moral Decisions 8 
Bystanders and Witnessing 10 
Moral Injury 13 
Hypothesis 17 Participants 17 Method 18 Data Analysis 20 Results 21 Initial Checks 21 General Linear Model 22 Correlations 23 Guilt, shame, and feeling troubled 24 
Discussion 25 
Appendix A: Adapted Moral Injury Events Scale 31 
Appendix B: Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events 33 
Appendix C: PCL-C 36 
Bibliography 39 
 
  
  
Introduction 
Regret, as pictured by Janet Landman (1993), is a “stringy-haired, boneless 
woman sunk in the dead arms of the past.” She would be in a room with only cobwebs 
and ghosts, “forever staring with glazed eyes out a window, forever straining to hear 
ancient footfalls, which, were they to appear, would be muffled by the drone of her 
mutterings about what might have been”(Landman, 1993). Regret, which can occur in 
anticipation of an event or after, is a state of feeling sorry, repentant or disappointed 
over a misfortune, limitation, loss, shortcoming, transgression, or mistake (Landman, 
1993). A taxonomic study of the vocabulary of emotion found that regret is clustered 
with feelings of guilt, remorse, repentance, and feeling sorrow (Storm & Storm 1987). 
This group of emotions implies a sense of agency, that one’s own choice and behavior 
or lack of behavior bears responsibility. The survey used within this study asks what 
troubles us more, when we witness an act that goes against our moral code, when we 
fail to act when we see something that violates our moral code, or when we commit an 
act that violates our moral code?  
This is an exploratory research question. The literature supports both action and 
failing to act as factors in eliciting troubling emotions such as regret. Fewer studies 
have focused on witnessing, but I anticipate that witnessing an immoral event will 
produce less regret than acting or failing to act. This research will be valuable because it 
will add to the study of emotional consequences when we witness, do, or fail to prevent 
actions that go against our morals. The data reported on in this study were collected as 
part of a larger project investigating moral injury.  
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Moral injury is a psychiatric wound caused by witnessing, failing to act, or 
acting in a way that transgresses a deeply held personal moral code. There has been 
strong support of the concept of moral injury from health and religious professionals 
(Drescher et al., 2011). Because moral injury is a relatively new concept, much of the 
literature has focused on defining moral injury (Drescher & Foy, 2012; Maguen & Litz, 
2012; Litz et al., 2009; Shay, 2012), methods for measuring moral injury (Currier et al., 
2013; Drescher et al, 2011; Nash et al., 2013) and the symptoms of moral injury (Bryan, 
2014; Currier et al., 2014; Farnworth et al., 2014; Vargas et al., 2013). A better 
understanding of moral injury would be helpful for insight about a variety of 
populations, such as returning war veterans, people living in a war zone, or victims of 
certain crimes. This study distinguishes between the experiences of witnessing an 
immoral event, failing to act, and acting in an immoral way. Some studies have focused 
specifically on the differences in impact between acting and witnessing (Bryan et al., 
2014; MacNair, 2002) but fewer studies have compared all three experiences. This 
study will provide more detailed information on the emotional impact of morally 
injurious events separated by experience, adding to the literature that exists on the 
symptoms of moral injury. This study will also provide additional insight into the 
impact immoral events and regret may have on a traditional student population.    
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Regret 
As defined above, regret can occur before or after a misfortune, limitation, loss, 
shortcoming, transgression, or mistake. According to Shamanoff (1984), regret is the 
second most commonly named emotion in daily conversation. Regret can be detrimental 
and beneficial and the effects of regret vary in their severity. Regret can cause us to 
avoid the past, failing to learn from it or sometimes even to acknowledge it. Regret can 
cause us to feel as though we are inadequate and provoke hesitation in the future 
(Landman, 1993). Gabrielle Taylor, a philosopher, suggests there are three ways that 
regret can be destructive: too much time spent regretting something, how intensely one 
feels regret, and how much importance is placed on the regretted matter (1985). On the 
other hand, regret can also be beneficial. By recognizing feelings of regret, we can 
recognize the past, both our actions and also events that happen to us. Anticipatory 
regret can guide future actions and serve as a motivating force. The surveys used in this 
study ask participants about feeling troubled after an event, connecting the study to the 
literature on regret.  
Regret After Actions or Inactions 
Feeling troubled after a decision is closely related to both hot and cold feelings 
of regret. Hot feelings of regret, such as self-centered anger, guilt, shame, 
embarrassment, disgust, frustration, and irritation, have been found to occur after 
actions (Gilovich, Medvec & Kahneman, 1998). Cold feelings of regret include 
wistfulness, longing, nostalgia, and despair and are more likely to occur after a failure 
to act (Gilovich, Medvec & Kahneman, 1998).  Kedia and Hilton (2010) supported this 
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research, finding that experiences of regret and self-conscious emotions were likely to 
occur together, with self-conscious emotions such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, and 
remorse being especially prevalent when recalling regretted actions versus failures to 
act. 
In addition to the hot and cold feelings of regret, an important factor in the 
feeling of regret is the amount of time that has passed since the event. Research 
conducted by Gilovich and Medvec (1994) found that actions caused more intense 
feelings of regret in the short-term but failures to act were more likely to cause those 
feelings after a longer period of time. Using open-ended questions about people’s 
regrets, it was found that more often people brought up regretting things they had not 
done, actions they had failed to take. They theorize that humans have biological 
mechanisms that assist in diminishing the regret felt for actions over time as well as 
different cognitive functions for recalling actions or inactions. Diminishing the regret 
felt for actions could be connected to our sense of agency, that a person is capable of 
changing their behavior and seeking a different course of action. Another study 
conducted by Gilovich and Medvec (1994) found that more people took action to 
correct a regrettable action than to correct a regrettable inaction.  
Agency, or feeling responsible for an outcome can also affect how regretful 
someone feels (Weisberg & Beck, 2012; Sommer, Peters, Glascher, & Buchel, 2009; 
Pirontti et al., 2010). Increased feelings of responsibility can increase the regret 
someone feels. Landman (1993) lists three possible distinctions for agency: the self as 
agent, other as agent, and circumstances as agent. The self as agent would suggest 
personal responsibility for either acting or failing to act. Other as agent would suggest 
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less personal responsibility, perhaps leading less to regret than to disappointment, as 
suggested by Coricelli et al. (2005). Circumstances as agent would also suggest less 
personal responsibility. This study differentiates between self as agent on the one hand, 
and another person or circumstance as agent, on the other. The self as agent would bear 
responsibility for acting or failing to act. Witnessing an immoral act would be more 
closely related to the idea of the other or circumstance as an agent, suggesting an 
outside force that prevents personal responsibility.  
How people recall their actions or failures to act can also affect feelings of 
regret. When asked to look back from a first-person perspective, as though reliving the 
event, subjects’ regret for actions increased more than their regret for failing to act 
(Valenti, Libby, & Eibach, 2011). Actions, when looked at from a first-person 
perspective, have a greater effect on feelings of regret than actions looked at from a 
third-person perspective (Valenti, Libby & Eibach, 2011). When asked to look at an 
event from the third-person, regret was increased for failures to act more than actions. A 
possible explanation for this is how we place these events within the general frame of 
our lives. Failures to act, when looked at from a third-person point of view, are 
perceived to have a greater impact on our lives as a whole than actions (Valenti, Libby 
& Eibach, 2011). Actions looked at from a first-person perspective, are more likely to 
cause people to reflect on their own behaviors compared to looking at actions from a 
third-person perspective, which can diminish the intensity of regret because it places the 
action in the broader context.  
Some studies that have found that failing to act results in greater feelings of 
regret. Former United States President Bill Clinton cites the failure to intervene in the 
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Rwandan Genocide as one of his greatest regrets in life (McMillan, 2010). One reason 
inaction could cause more regret is the passage of time. Clinton’s comment about his 
regret over the Rwandan Genocide occurred four years after the genocide took place, 
long enough for the facts of the genocide to come to light and for Clinton and the 
international community to recognize what could have been done to stop it.  
Kahneman and Miller (1986) theorize that it is easier to construct alternative 
mental outcomes when an action was taken compared to a failure to act. They suggest 
actions are the norm behavior. Alternative mental outcomes are easier to construct 
because of the perceived normality of acting than the abnormality associated with 
failing to act. It is easier for participants to imagine the outcome if they had not acted in 
an immoral way than imagining acting in an immoral manner. Regret compares reality 
to a better, fictitious reality and requires counterfactual thinking, which is the ability to 
imagine a distinct reality (Weisberg & Beck, 2012). Creating counterfactual realities for 
actions was found to be easier than creating counterfactual realities for failures to act, 
supporting Kahneman and Miller’s theory that actions were the norm behavior (N’gbala 
& Branscombe, 1996).  
 Humans wish to appear fair and moral even when they do not act in such a way 
(Batson et al., 1997). Therefore, subjects might be more likely to regret immoral actions 
than failures to act because of the way they wish to perceive themselves, how others 
perceive them, and a desire to be judged less harshly.  The legal system defines many 
actions as crimes, such as assault, theft, murder, child abuse, and so on. Failures to act, 
such as tax evasion or child neglect, are less frequently criminalized than actions.     
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Morality 
Regret and morality are closely linked. Along with shame, remorse, and guilt, 
regret is defined as a moral emotion (Tangney et al., 2007). Morality is commonly 
defined as prescriptive norms that attempt to regulate how people treat one another 
(Decety & Howard, 2013). Morality is a combination of emotional, cognitive, and 
motivational processes. Morals can be personal or shared between families and societies 
and are assumptions about how a person should behave and how things should work 
(Litz et al., 2009). Morals serve an evolutionary purpose and foster cooperation and 
growth within societies while helping to censure instincts, such as aggression, that could 
be detrimental. This study specifically asks participants about immoral events, linking 
the questionnaire to the study of immorality and the impact of immoral decisions.  
Decety and Howard (2013) suggest that specific neural networks support moral 
cognition. These neural networks are also important in supporting emotion, cognitive, 
and motivational processes. Knowledge of immorality is negatively associated with the 
commission of an immoral act (Reynolds, Dang, Yam & Leavitt, 2013). This follows 
Kohlberg’s theory of morality, which states that morality stems from the structures of 
moral reasoning and moral behavior is encouraged by knowing what is moral and 
immoral (Gibbs, 2014). However, Bandura’s theory of morality suggests that even if a 
person does know what is moral or immoral, there are other processes for mediating 
reasoning and behavior, such as self-regulatory mechanisms (Gibbs, 2014). Bandura’s 
theory of morality focuses more on how moral reasoning is translated into moral action. 
Intentionality and the knowledge that something was immoral are important. Bandura’s 
belief in other self-regulatory mechanisms could provide for an explanation for immoral 
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actions committed by participants within the study. There should be fewer examples of 
people acting immorally than failing to act or witnessing because of the negative 
association between increased knowledge as to what is immoral and commissions of 
immoral acts.  
Moral Decisions 
Actions that were later regretted were judged to be more immoral than failures 
to act that were regretted (Kedia and Hilton, 2010). Reports of feeling troubled when 
recalling instances of immoral actions should be higher than reports of feeling troubled 
when recalling immoral failures to act because of the perceived increase in immorality. 
Regret, guilt, and shame are also counterfactual emotions, showing the overlap between 
morality, fictitious realities, and different outcomes. A decision that includes a moral 
dimension can produce more post-decisional internal conflict than choices without a 
moral dimension (Krosch et al., 2012). Krosh et al. (2012) used the example of a United 
Nations Peacekeeper in a conflict zone, where the orders are to maintain neutrality but 
doing so would harm victims of the conflict who are asking for safe refuge. The choice 
to disobey orders and violate neutrality or leave the victims of the conflict to defend 
themselves has a moral component that makes the decision more conflicting. Morally 
challenging dilemmas produce more post-decisional internal conflict because they are 
rarely good vs. bad choices; people are often faced with deciding between the lesser of 
two evils. Therefore, the choice to commit an immoral action or failure to act should be 
considered both more immoral and produce more post-decisional internal conflict than 
actions that do not contain a moral aspect.  
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The example of the United Nations Peacekeepers assumes a level of agency that 
may be absent in some situations. Peacekeepers could witness immoral events but not 
have made the choice to act or fail to act. The impact moral decisions have on post-
decisional internal conflict would be nonexistent because there was no decision to 
make.  
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Bystanders and Witnessing 
The connection between witnessing an immoral act and subsequently feeling 
troubled is less well studied. Witnessing an immoral act is distinct from the failure to 
act because witnessing suggests that it was not a personal choice not to act. Much of the 
bystander research focuses on events such as the Rwandan genocide or the Holocaust, 
where bystanders such as citizens or the international community failed to intervene. 
Monroe (2008) hypothesizes that passive bystanders will distance themselves from an 
event and view themselves as a victim as well. Monroe interviewed 100 people and 
focused on analyzing the responses of five different people. Tony was involved in the 
Dutch resistance during World War II. But his cousin, Beatrix, who shared many 
demographic similarities, stood by and watched, feeling vulnerable because she did not 
feel that she had a choice to act (Monroe, 2008). These findings suggest witnessing an 
immoral event could result in feeling weak or victimized, something that could impact 
feeling troubled. One of Monroe’s findings is that the lack of distinction between in-
groups and out-groups could facilitate being a bystander. If enough contrast exists, then 
people are more likely to take a role as perpetrator or rescuer.  
Bystanders often have a low self-image and see themselves as weak. They 
believe they have little efficacy and control to change a situation. There is an external 
force that is responsible for an immoral event and controls their behavior (Monroe, 
2008). Koelsch, Brown, and Boisen (2012) suggested that there are four steps between 
bystanders and taking action. The first is noticing a situation or event, then interpreting 
it as a situation that requires action followed by a feeling of responsibility to act, and 
ending with a person having the skills or knowledge to intervene. Bystanders can 
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encounter difficulties at each step. Bystanders can fail to notice a situation due to their 
status in society or because they choose to remain separate from it. Bystanders can also 
not know what to do when witnessing an immoral act. President Bill Clinton and the 
international community may have not known how to act when the Rwandan genocide 
broke out or failed to recognize the extent to which action was needed. It was not until 
after the facts were known that the international community expressed regret at not 
acting.  
In addition to bystanders who are present in person when an event or action 
violates their morals, there is also the possibility that bystanders are separated by space 
or time. Watching a war on television, such as the Vietnam War, which was widely 
broadcast, could potentially violate a person’s morals but they would be unable to act 
not by choice but because of the situation they were in. Another possibility for being 
unable to act is the status of the witness. Within a prison, prisoners rarely have the 
power or choice to act when they witness an immoral act. There is less research that 
specifically looks at bystanders and feelings of regret. Oftentimes the research is more 
characteristic of bystanders who chose not to act rather than bystanders who could not 
act for any combination of reasons.  
One questionnaire included in this study asked participants about witnessing an 
event that resulted in death or serious injury. One of the more common responses was 
witnessing domestic violence. Children who witness domestic violence are witnesses 
who lack the power to intervene in the situation. Research on children who witness 
domestic violence has shown the effects of witnessing to be present even if the child 
heard the violence or saw the results after the event (Meltzer et al., 2009). Witnessing 
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domestic violence can produce psychological, emotional, and behavioral problems (see 
Edleson, 1999 for a review). Internalized problems, such as depression and anxiety, can 
occur when children witness domestic violence. Meltzer et al. (2009) found as many as 
one in 25 children witness domestic violence, with higher rates found for lower-income 
families compared to middle and upper-class families. Witnessing domestic violence 
also shows a temporal pattern. Consequences from witnessing domestic violence can 
vary based on the age of child when they witnessed the violence. Additionally, different 
effects can arise as the time since the violence increases, with children who had recently 
been removed from a violent household showing more negative effects than children 
who had been out of the environment for a longer period of time (Wolfe, Zak, Wilson, 
& Jaffe, 1986).  
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Moral Injury 
Violating one’s moral code has different effects for different people. The 
extreme side of such events can be seen within the study of veterans and moral injury 
(Litz et al., 2009). Soldiers often transgress moral beliefs themselves or experience 
conflict when witnessing immoral actions committed by others. Moral injury 
encompasses perpetrating, failing to prevent, or witnessing events (Maguen and Litz, 
2012). Killing is often something that a soldier has been taught not to do their whole 
life. Within the military, there is a separate moral code, where killing is normalized and 
violence is to be expected. Violating a moral code that has been established early on in 
life can have lasting effects. For soldiers, moral injury is a serious psychiatric wound 
that can cause symptoms similar to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Litz et al., 2009). 
Intrusive memories, avoidance, and emotional numbing are all symptoms of a morally 
injurious event (Litz et al., 2009). Guilt and shame, included as items in the survey, 
along with inner turmoil and alienation, are also symptoms of moral injury (Drescher & 
Foy, 2012).  
The diagnosis of PTSD has traditionally seen soldiers as victims, who have 
often faced sustained physical, mental, or emotional stress. However, the idea of moral 
injury shows that soldiers can be damaged by their own actions as perpetrators as well. 
Recent violence, such as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are increasingly 
complicated because of the urban nature of the fighting. Soldiers are faced with a 
combination of insurgents and non-combatants and must decide which is which. Moral 
injury suggests a loss of trust, resulting in an attack on the mind, soul, and body (Shay, 
2012). Soldiers may be unable to trust themselves to correctly distinguish between 
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combatants and civilians. They may also be unable to trust fellow soldiers or officers 
who have chosen immoral actions in the past.  
Witnessing an immoral act is included within the definition of moral injury (Litz 
et al., 2009). Bystanders who handle or encounter dead bodies or human remains can be 
morally injured but have no chance to act because of the separation in both time and 
space or lack of agency. The sensory effects of violence, such as images, smells, and 
sounds, can be comparable to direct life threats in their consequences and lasting effects 
(Litz et al., 2009). Because of the strict hierarchy within the military, bystanders may be 
soldiers who are betrayed by their commanders and forced to act or witness something 
that violates their morals. The literature on witnessing and moral injury is less 
substantial and this study will add to the emotional impact of witnessing an immoral 
event.  
The mental consequences for civilians in combat zones include Post-traumatic 
stress disorder, depression, anxiety, and moral injury (Neria, Besser, Kiper & Westphal, 
2010; Litz et al., 2009). Civilians who lived through the Israel-Gaza 2009 war showed 
symptoms of PTSD, depression, and anxiety. A sample taken during the war, 2 months 
after, and 4 months after showed a decline in symptoms, suggesting a temporal pattern 
of symptoms after witnessing combat (Neria, Besser, Kiper & Westphal, 2010). There is 
a wide base of research looking at civilians in war and PTSD but the fewer studies have 
focused on civilians in war and moral injury.  
Moral injury is connected with self-injurious thoughts and behaviors. Thoughts 
and behaviors can be socially, mentally, and physically injurious. Bryan et al. (2014) 
found that suicidal ideation was higher among veterans who had committed a morally 
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injurious act than those who had witnessed a similar act, suggesting that action has a 
greater impact on soldiers than witnessing. Being actively involved in the commission 
of atrocities resulted in higher rates of PTSD than witnessing similar events (MacNair, 
2002). 
Morally injurious events can change the global meaning systems of veterans, 
and many veterans have difficulties finding new meaning. The difficulty in finding new 
meaning is associated with poorer mental health status (Currier, Holland, & Malott, 
2014). Self-forgiveness and making meaning are important in healing moral injury 
(Currier, Holland, & Malott, 2014; Litz et al., 2009). The current Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) does not recognize moral injury as a 
disorder and Litz et al. (2009) suggests that there are multiple possible reasons behind 
this. Clinicians may not feel qualified to deal with morally injurious events because 
acknowledging moral injury may somehow excuse immoral behavior and the 
perpetration of violence. Veterans could be recommended to seek religious counseling 
or even fail to disclose events because of the fear of repercussions. Kinghorn (2012) 
supports the inclusion of religious counseling for morally injured veterans and argues 
about the importance of including moral theology alongside psychology in treating 
moral injury.  
The Moral Injury Questionnaire, developed for veterans, shares many similar 
items with the questionnaires used within this study, including items on committing and 
witnessing immoral actions and events. The Moral Injury Questionnaire shows that 
higher scores are correlated with increased exposure to life threatening events, higher 
rates of trauma, PTSD, and increased risks for depression (Currier, Holland, Drescher & 
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Foy, 2013). Moral emotions, such as shame, guilt, anger, disgust, and contempt were 
found in higher rates for veterans who suffered from moral injuries than those who did 
not and that the onset of those emotions could occur after a veteran has returned to 
civilian life (Farnsworth et al., 2014). This study incorporates similar items from the 
Moral Injury Questionnaire, adapted for use with civilian populations, as well as 
questions to measure feelings of shame and guilt specifically.  
The questionnaires used within this project were created for the study of moral 
injury. As preliminary surveys, they were completed by University of Oregon students, 
a population made up of very few veterans. Using a population of predominantly non-
veterans is useful because it can serve to provide possible comparisons with veteran 
populations. A population of veterans who served in combat areas often has additional 
complications, such as co-morbidity with PTSD or Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBIs). 
TBIs can damage the physical structures in the brain, impacting the neural passages for 
regret, moral cognition, and emotional cognition. A population of non-veterans can also 
serve as a comparison for a similar population of non-combatants who have acted and 
failed to act in an immoral way or witnessed an immoral event, adding to the literature 
on witnessing and moral injury.  
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Hypothesis 
Based on the research reviewed, I hypothesize that people who act in a way that 
violates their moral code will report feeling more troubled than will people who violate 
their moral code by failing to act. People will feel less troubled by witnessing 
something that violates their moral code than they will by acting or failing to act. This is 
in line, for example, with Kruger, Wirtz, and Miller's finding (2005) that people 
regretted having changed a correct test answer to an incorrect one more than they 
regretted failing to change an incorrect answer to a correct answer.  Regrets caused by 
actions are likely to elicit self-centered emotions such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, 
and self-directed anger (Kedia & Hilton, 2011). These emotions should have a stronger 
effect on feeling troubled than feelings of wistfulness, which is more typical for regrets 
when people fail to act (Gilovich, Medvic, & Kahneman, 1998). Witnessing an immoral 
event requires another person or circumstances to be the agent, resulting in less personal 
responsibility than acting or failing to act and lessening feelings of regret.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from Psychology 201 and 202 classes at the 
University of Oregon. Participants were awarded class credit for their participation in 
the survey. The surveys were conducted over fall 2013 and winter 2014 term. For fall 
term, there was a total of 302 participants (207 female, 76 male, 19 who declined to 
provide a gender) and the average age was 19.43 years. For the winter term survey, 
there was a total of 272 participants (208 female, 62 male, and 2 who declined to 
provide a gender). The average age for the winter term survey was 19.49 years old. 
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There were a total of 574 participants for the survey (415 female, 138 male, 21 who 
declined to name a gender). The average age for all participants was 19.47 years, and 
ranged from 18 to 51. 
Method 
William Schumacher, a graduate student in the University of Oregon 
Department of Psychology created both surveys. The language used between the two 
surveys differs slightly in grammar. Participants were asked to answer ten questions as a 
part of the Adapted Moral Injury Events Scale (see Appendix A). The questions asked if 
participants had witnessed, acted, or failed to act in a way that violated their moral code 
and then how troubled they felt after each option. The scale then asked about feelings of 
betrayal by leaders, peers, others, and institutions. Each question on the Adapted Moral 
Injury Events Scale was rated using a 6-point scale, ranging from 1-Strongly Disagree 
to 6-Strongly Agree. Within the survey given to participants of fall 2013, an option to 
[Decline to Answer] was given. In the survey given winter 2014, this answer was not an 
option. In addition to the Adapted Moral Injury Events Scale, each survey included 
additional assessments. 
The Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events (See Appendix B) inquired 
about the history of the participant’s experience with possibly traumatic acts, including 
actual or threatened injury, death, or actual or threatened sexual violence. Questions 
include whether the participant has committed the act, if the participant had been a 
victim, or if the participant had witnessed the act. This assessment was only included in 
the fall 2013 survey. This may prime participants to think about extreme situations as it 
was asked before the Adapted Moral Injury Scale and could have an effect on the 
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frequency of experiencing witnessing, failing to act, or acting in an immoral way as 
participants failed to call to mind less extreme instances of moral violations. However, 
the Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events does ask for a brief description of the 
event if the participant answered yes to any of the situations. This information can be 
used as insight into some of the possible situations that are being called to mind. 
The PCL-C (See Appendix C) is a twenty-item checklist based off of the DSM 
definition for PTSD and trauma asking participants if they have experienced any items 
out of a list of problems and complaints that sometimes arise after being exposed to 
traumatic experiences. The PCL-C uses a 5-point scale indicating how much certain 
criteria have been a problem in the past month. Questions 18 and 19 on the PCL-C are 
relevant to my research because they ask about feeling guilty or shameful about things 
you did or didn’t do during a stressful experience in the past. Guilt, shame, and feeling 
troubled should be correlated as they share similar emotional traits and effects.  
The Treatment Satisfaction Questionnaire asked participants about their 
experience with psychiatric treatment. Those who respond yes when asked if they have 
received psychological treatment are asked to fill out additional questions about their 
levels of satisfaction with their treatment. This questionnaire was only included in the 
winter 2014 survey and was not relevant to my research question. 
I will be focusing my analyses on the first six questions found in the Adapted 
Moral Injury Events Scale. Those six questions are broken up into three pairs of 
questions. The first asks the frequency in which participants have seen things that were 
morally wrong. Following that, it asks how troubled those participants were. The 
second set asks about the frequency in which participants acted in ways that violated 
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their moral code and how troubled they were by that. The third set of questions asks 
about the frequency in which participants saw something that was morally wrong but 
failed to act and how troubled they were by that failure.  
Data Analysis 
Data from each survey was collected and data from questions 1-6 from the 
Adapted Moral Injury Events Scale was selected. Questions 1 and 2, on witnessing and 
feeling troubled after witnessing were paired together. Questions 3 and 4, on acting and 
feeling troubled after acting were paired together. And questions 5 and 6, on failing to 
act and feeling troubled after failing to act were paired together. I ran a 2-way repeated 
measures ANOVA to find if there was a significant difference in means based on the 
term. Based on those results, means, standard deviations, and sample sizes are reported 
separately for the two terms. I also ran generalized linear models to see if there were 
significant mean differences in being troubled between experiences after accounting for 
mean differences in frequency of experience.  Separately, I also calculated correlations 
between each pair of questions responses from each survey. Questions in which 
participants selected [Decline to Answer] were omitted from descriptive statistics and 
calculations of correlations.  
Additional correlations were calculated between the highest “troubled”  
response to either inaction and action, and responses to guilt and shame items to 
investigate any association between feeling troubled and feelings of guilt or shame. 
Max responses for feeling troubled were used because the guilt and shame items did not 
differentiate between failing to act and acting.  
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Results 
Initial Checks 
In order to see if the questions about death, serious injury, and sexual of physical 
violence from the fall, 2013 survey had an impact on the frequency of reports for 
witnessing, failing to act, or acting, I ran a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA to look 
for significant main and interaction effects. The 2-way repeated measures ANOVA 
showed a main effect for each experience, witnessing, failing to act, or acting, F(2, 
528)=879.67, p<0.05. It also showed a main effect for term (Fall 2013 and Winter 
2014), F(1, 264)=773.68, p<0.05. The 2-way repeated measures ANOVA also showed a 
significant interaction effect F(2, 528)=89.97, p<0.05. Because of the significant 
interaction effect between experience and term, each survey should be viewed as a 
distinct study.  
I also ran a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA to investigate the main effects 
and interaction between feeling troubled and term. The results from the 2-way repeated 
measures ANOVA showed a main effect for feeling troubled after witnessing, failing to 
act, or acting F(2, 528)=27.00, p<0.05. There was also a main effect for term F(1, 
264)=112.45, p<0.05. Results show no significant interaction between feeling troubled 
after witnessing, failing to act, or acting and term, F(2, 528)=0.57, p>0.05.  
Due to the significant differences in frequency means between terms for 
witnessing, failing to act, and acting, either each survey needs to be analyzed separately, 
or term needs to be controlled for in other analyses.  Means, standard deviations, and 
sample size for each item are displayed separately for the terms in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Means (standard deviations) Divided by Survey 
 Fall 2013 Winter 2014 
Action 2.87 (1.47) 3.95 (1.29) 
Failure to Act 3.19 (1.56) 3.81 (1.33) 
Witnessing 3.91 (1.48) 4.66 (1.38) 
Troubled after Action 3.18 (1.71) 3.88 (1.51) 
Troubled after Failure to Act 3.04 (1.56) 3.62 (1.42) 
Troubled after Witnessing 3.53 (1.53) 4.18 (1.43) 
Note. For fall, 2013 n (Act) =265, n (Fail to Act) =269, n (Witness) =267. For winter, 
2104 n=272  
General Linear Model 
To test the hypotheses about differences in being troubled based on different 
types of experiences, I used a general linear model with difference scores between the 
two “troubled” responses as the dependent variable and the mean-centered frequency of 
the two types of experiences being compared as covariates.  This approach helped 
control for respondents feeling more troubled based simply on having more experience, 
rather than due to the type of experience (action, failure to act, or witnessing).  For the 
first hypothesis, the difference in troubled scores was calculated by subtracting troubled 
from acting from troubled from failing to act. Covariates were mean centered by 
subtracting each score from the mean for the type of experience, in this case either 
failing to act or acting.  The initial model also included the interaction between the 
mean-centered scores for failing to act and acting, and the term (the two different 
survey periods). The initial generalized linear model showed no significant effect for 
the interaction or the term so I ran a simplified model dropping these predictors. Results 
from the simplified general linear model showed a significant intercept (indicating that 
the difference in troubled scores was non-zero) but a very weak effect size,  
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F(1, 534)=8.50, p<0.05,  β = −0.21 and eta squared = 0.016.  The negative beta weight 
indicates that acting was more troubling than failing to act. 
I ran additional linear models to test whether troubled difference scores were 
significant for acting minus witnessing and failing to act minus witnessing. Because of 
the insignificant interaction and term effects, I used the same simplified model as 
before. The troubled difference score was calculated by subtracting feeling troubled 
after witnessing from feeling troubled after acting. Results from the generalized linear 
model show a significant difference in troubled scores based on experience, either 
acting or witnessing. The intercept was significant and had a weak effect size, F(1, 
534)=17.19, p<0.05. The β = −0.53 and eta squared = 0.098. The negative beta weight 
indicates witnessing was more troubling than acting. A third generalized linear model 
was run to compare troubled difference scores for failing to act and witnessing. 
Troubled difference scores were calculated by subtracting witnessing from failing to 
act. Results from the generalized linear model show a significant difference and a very 
weak effect size in troubled scores based on experience, failing to act or witnessing. 
F(1, 536)=58.38, p<0.05. The β =−0.33 and eta squared = 0.031. The negative beta 
weight indicates witnessing was more troubling than failing to act. 
Correlations 
Additionally, I ran correlations for each pair of questions separated by survey to 
find the strength of the relationship between each experience and feeling troubled. 
Correlations are displayed in the table below. 
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Table 2: Correlations between Experience and Feeling Troubled by Term 
 Fall, 2013 Winter, 2014 
Acting and Feeling Troubled 0.630 0.517 
Failing to Act and Feeling Troubled 0.827 0.686 
Witnessing and Feeling Troubled 0.488 0.471 
 
R to Z transformations indicated a significant difference between failing to act and 
acting for Fall, 2013, z=4.85, p<0.05 and for Winter, 2014, z=3.11, p<0.05. R to Z 
transformations also indicated a significant difference between failing to act and 
witnessing for Fall, 2013, z=7.43, p<0.05, and for Winter, 2013, z=3.82, p<0.05. There 
was a significant difference between acting and witnessing for Fall, 2013, z=2.39, 
p<0.05 but not for acting and witnessing from Winter, 2014, z=0.71, p>0.05. 
Guilt, shame, and feeling troubled 
The items on guilt and shame from the PCL-C did not differentiate between 
acting and failing to act in an immoral manner. The PCL-C also asked participants to 
limit their responses of feeling guilty or shameful to examples of acting or failing to act 
from the last month. Findings from item asking how guilty does a participant feel, show 
M=2.03, sd=1.17, n=534. Findings from item asking how shameful does a participant 
feel, M=1.89, sd=1.11, n=534.  
The correlation between feeling troubled after acting or failing to act in an 
immoral manner and feeling guilty was weak but statistically significant, r=0.294, 
p<.01. A similar correlation was found between feeling troubled and feeling shame, 
r=0.289, p<.01. 
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Discussion 
Committing an immoral act, failing to act during an immoral act, or witnessing 
an immoral act can lead to reports of feeling troubled. Results indicated that, as 
hypothesized, acting can be significantly more troubling than failing to act. However, 
the effect size was very small. Results for comparison with witnessing were significant 
in the opposite direction from that hypothesized: Witnessing was more troubling than 
both acting (another very small effect size) and failing to act (the largest effect size, but 
still relatively weak).  
One possible explanation for the unexpected results for witnessing could be the 
length of time between the events brought to mind and when the survey was taken. 
Whether a regret is construed as open or closed, unresolved or resolved, affects the 
fading affect bias. Failing to act, seen as a failure to yield a desired outcome, persists in 
memory, and regret from failures to act is more likely to remain open, defined as 
“unfinished business,” than regret from action (Beike & Crone, 2008). The fading affect 
bias is a psychological process that suggests that information involving negative 
emotions tends to be forgotten at a faster rate than information involving positive 
emotions (Beike & Crone, 2008). However, regrets from actions do not show the same 
pattern for the fading affect bias as memories that do not involve regret (Beike & Crone, 
2008). This suggests that the length of time that has passed between the regretted 
actions does not have a significant effect on forgetting negative emotions.  
The length of time that has passed from the action, while not asked directly, 
could have had an impact on the ratings of feeling troubled separate from the effects of 
the fading affect bias. Participants who were remembering episodes of failures to act 
 
 
26  
may have more open memories of failing to act. Beike and Crone (2008) found that 
participants who had open memories of acting or failing to act but still tried to forget 
them were more likely to experience intrusive feelings of regret compared to 
participants who had closed memories, defined as “a closed book.” The strong 
correlations between acting or failing to act and feeling troubled could be a result of the 
experiences still being construed as open and the lack of the fading affect bias.  
The Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events, included in the Fall, 2013 
survey only, asked participants about serious events which resulted in death, injury, or 
sexual violence. These extreme examples of moral violations and could have prompted 
participants to recall more extreme situations when asked about moral violations, and 
perhaps to downplay or dismiss less extreme experiences of moral violations. Results 
indicated that mean responses to the moral injury and troubled questions were lower 
across the board for the survey that included this scale. Among 302 participants the 
Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events yielded seven yes responses for committed 
an act that resulted in death, serious injury, or sexual assault. Four respondents declined 
to provide details. Of the three who did, one participant had seen their sister physically 
abused by their father when they were young, one had threatened someone, and one 
participant had served in the military and killed or injured an unknown number of 
people.  
Forty-three participants had witnessed an immoral act. Five participants cited 
domestic violence against a family member when they were younger. Thirteen 
participants cited witnessing the death, serious injury, or violence against a friend or 
family member. Seven participants declined to answer the follow up question. The 
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remaining participants cited witnessing events that did not involve anyone they knew. 
Witnessing an immoral event that resulted in death, serious injury, or violence was 
much more commonly endorsed than committing a similar act. In both surveys, 
participants reported witnessing immoral events significantly more frequently than 
acting in an immoral way. Because of the increased frequency, it is more likely that 
witnessing an immoral event occurred more recently. This could explain why the mean 
troubled scores for witnessing an immoral event were higher than they were for acting 
or failing to act and also why the difference score analysis provided the same pattern of 
results, even after controlling for the relative frequency of the two types of experiences. 
There may have been less time for negative feelings to fade after witnessing an immoral 
event than committing a similar immoral act.  
 Results from these two studies show a very strong positive correlation between 
failing to act during an immoral event and reports of feeling troubled afterwards. 
Committing an immoral act and feeling troubled afterward show a strong positive 
correlation. The weakest correlation was found between witnessing an immoral event 
and feeling troubled. The results fit partially with my hypothesis. The correlation 
between feeling troubled and the guilt and shame items from PCL-C were both weak 
and positive.  
A possible source for the stronger correlation between failing to act and feeling 
troubled could stem from how participants rate their sense of agency. Increased agency 
is found in actions rather than failures to act. And a regrettable action is easier to correct 
than a regrettable failure to act (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994). And it is harder to construct 
alternatives to a failure to act than action (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The ability to 
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construct an alternative action and correct a regrettable action allows for the participant 
to reconcile with wanting to be seen as moral (Batson et al., 1997). The lack of personal 
agency, apparent when the participant witnessed an immoral event, suggests that 
another person or circumstance was the agent of the moral transgression. Lacking 
agency can lead to feelings of disappointment rather than regret (Coricelli et al., 2005). 
When responding to the pair of questions on witnessing an immoral event and feeling 
troubled, participants could have reported feeling less troubled because they were 
feeling more disappointed than troubled or regretful. Participants could also be recalling 
instances of witnessing as failures to act, considering events as failures to act even if 
they did not know how to act or had no power in a situation. This could be the case for 
participants who recalled witnessing domestic violence when, as a child, they would 
have had no power to intervene. But when the participant recalls the event, they may 
judge it as a failure to act because they now know how to respond.  
However, the correlations between feeling troubled and guilt and feeling 
troubled and shame were weak. This suggests that the use of the term “troubled” could 
be less reflective of feeling regret and other associated emotions than previously 
anticipated. Future studies using the questions about feeling troubled could benefit from 
more exact language, questioning participants about feeling regret, shame, or guilt. 
Additional changes to the overall survey could include moving the questions about 
death, serious injury, violence to the end in order to prevent limiting participants to 
thinking only of extreme cases of moral violation. 
Another limitation to this study is the set-up of the six questions. Between the 
two surveys, the questions were asked in the same order. There was no 
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counterbalancing used so every participant was asked about witnessing and feeling 
troubled first, then acting and feeling troubled, and failing to act and feeling troubled 
was always last. In future studies using this survey, questions should be 
counterbalanced in order to account for any differences in responses based on the order 
of questions.  
Moral injury can result from witnessing, failing to act, and acting. This research 
and further investigation into moral injury could clarify any differences that exist 
between the effects of witnessing, failing to act, or acting. This research is important 
because soldiers and people living in war zones can develop moral injuries. Civilians in 
war zones are less likely to act in a way that violates their moral code than soldiers. For 
civilians, research on witnessing and moral injury may therefore be more relevant than 
acting and moral injury.  
Further studies on moral decisions and regret could incorporate manipulations, 
looking at the difference in regret between participants within an action or failing to act 
scenario. Manipulating participants in conditions of action and failing to act would 
provide more detailed information about the differences. Research is also needed to 
investigate how moral decisions impact post-decisional emotions, distinguishing 
between regret, guilt, and shame. Research has shown that moral decisions create more 
post-decisional conflict compared to decisions without a moral component (Krosch et 
al., 2012). A future study could manipulate the moral component of decisions, looking 
at post-decisional emotions when a decision has a moral component compared to no 
moral component. Because of the nature of moral injury as a new area of study, 
additional research is needed to fully understand its impact and how to treat it. Findings 
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from this study suggest that acting has a greater impact on feeling troubled than failing 
to act or witnessing when an event violates a person’s moral code. The results from this 
survey increase our understanding of how a student population rates feeling troubled 
after a morally injurious event and adds to the ever-growing body of literature on moral 
injury. 
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Appendix A: Adapted Moral Injury Events Scale 
Adapted Moral Injury Events Scale 
Please choose a number to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements about your experiences. 
 
1. I saw things that were morally wrong. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
2.  I am troubled by having witnessed others’ immoral acts. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
3. I acted in ways that violated my own moral code or values. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
4. I am troubled by having acted in ways that violated my own morals or values. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
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5. I violated my own morals by failing to do something that I felt I should have done. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
6. I am troubled because I violated my morals by failing to do something I felt I should 
have done. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
7. I feel betrayed by leaders who I once trusted. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
8. I feel betrayed by peers who I once trusted. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
 
9. I feel betrayed by others outside my peer group who I once trusted. 
 
1 – Strongly Disagree 
2 – Moderately Disagree 
3 – Slightly Disagree 
4 – Slightly Agree 
5 – Moderately Agree 
6 – Strongly Agree 
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Appendix B: Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events 
Assessment of Potentially Injurious Events 
The following questions will ask you about the guiding principles of what you believe is 
right and wrong in social behavior, or your “moral code.” Some authority typically 
teaches a moral code to you, whether it is a religious institution, your culture, your 
parents, or the law. Please take a few moments to think about your moral code and 
times when you may have struggled with acts that you committed, were a victim of, or 
witnessed that violated your moral code. 
Now, please keep in mind that your answers are confidential and will not be associated 
with your name, and answer the questions below: 
 
1. Which religion most reflects your beliefs? 
 
Agnostic 
Atheist 
Buddhist 
Catholic 
Hindu 
Judaism 
Muslim 
Protestant 
Other 
 
2. How important is your religious identity to you on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is 
not important at all and 10 is extremely important? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. From where do you believe your personal moral code comes (please choose as many 
as you feel appropriate)? 
 
Natural Human Rights 
Laws (both state and federal) 
Parents 
Religion 
 
4. Have you committed an act that included: death, threatened death, actual or 
threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence? 
 
Yes  No 
 
5. If you answered “Yes,” to the previous question, please briefly describe the event: 
(if you answered “No” to the previous question, please select the box to decline to 
answer this question) 
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6. If you answered “Yes” to question 4, please rate how traumatic that experience was 
for you on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not traumatic at all and 10 is the most 
traumatic event imaginable: (if you answered “No” to question 4, please select the box 
to decline to answer this question) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
7. If you answered “Yes” to question 4, did this act violate your moral code? 
(if you answered “No” to question 4, please select the box to decline to answer this 
question) 
 
Yes  No 
 
8. Have you been the victim of an act that included: death, threatened death, actual or 
threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence? 
 
Yes  No 
 
9. If you answered “Yes,” to the previous question, please briefly describe the event: 
(if you answered “No” to the previous question, please select the box to decline to 
answer this question) 
 
10. If you answered “Yes” to question 8, please rate how traumatic that experience was 
for you on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not traumatic at all and 10 is the most 
traumatic event imaginable: (if you answered “No” to question 8, please select the box 
to decline to answer this question) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
11. If you answered “Yes” to question 8, do you think the perpetrator of this act did 
something that violated your moral code? (if you answered “No” to question 8, please 
select the box to decline to answer this question) 
 
Yes  No 
 
12. Have you witnessed an act that included: death, threatened death, actual or 
threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence? 
 
Yes  No 
 
13. If you answered “Yes,” to the previous question, please briefly describe the event: 
(if you answered “No” to the previous question, please select the box to decline to 
answer this question) 
 
14. If you answered “Yes” to question 12, please rate how traumatic that experience 
was for you on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not traumatic at all and 10 is the most 
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traumatic event imaginable: (if you answered “No” to question 12, please select the box 
to decline to answer this question) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
15. If you answered “Yes” to question 12, do you think the perpetrator of this act did 
something that violated your moral code? (if you answered “No” to question 12, please 
select the box to decline to answer this question) 
 
Yes  No 
 
16. If you answered “Yes” to question 12, do you feel as though you could have done 
something to prevent the act from occurring? (if you answered “No” to question 11, 
please select the box to decline to answer this question) 
 
 Yes No 
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Appendix C: PCL-C 
PCLC 
INSTRUCTIONS: Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes 
have in response to stressful life experiences. Please read each one carefully, then 
choose one of the options to indicate how much you have been bothered by that 
problem in the past month. 
 
1. Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of a stressful experience from the 
past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
2. Repeated, disturbing dreams of a stressful experience from the past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
3. Suddenly acting or feeling as if a stressful experience were happening again (as if 
you were reliving it)? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
4. Feeling very upset when something reminded you of a stressful experience from the 
past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
5. Having physical reactions (e.g., heart pounding, trouble breathing, sweating) when 
something reminded you of a stressful experience from the past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
6. Avoiding thinking about or talking about a stressful experience from the past or 
avoiding having feelings related to it? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
7. Avoiding activities or situations because they reminded you of a stressful experience 
from the past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
8. Trouble remembering important parts of a stressful experience from the past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
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9. Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
10. Feeling distant or cut off from other people? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
11. Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have loving feelings for those close to 
you? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
12. Feeling as if your future will somehow be cut short? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
13. Trouble falling or staying asleep? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
14. Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
15. Having difficulty concentrating? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
16. Being “superalert” or watchful or on guard? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
17. Feeling jumpy or easily startled? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
18. Feeling guilt for the things you did or didn’t do during a stressful experience in the 
past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
 
19. Feeling shame for the things you did or didn’t do during a stressful experience in the 
past? 
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1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
 
20. Feeling sadness related to a stressful experience in the past? 
 
1 – Not at all 2 – A little bit 3 – Moderately 4 – Quite a bit 5 – Extremely 
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